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Issues of Community Control in the Administration of Justice

The degree of community concern, involvement, and participation in issues which cause citizens to interact with its police, courts, or correctional agencies will reflect upon the sentiments of that community as to just how much control should be exercised over its Administration of Justice System.

Perhaps, because of the visibility of our police systems, and probably because of the excessive articulation of a role which is characterized by its adversarial nature, many segments of the community desire to focus more direct control over our Administration of Justice System in general, and our police in particular.

To facilitate the analysis of issues involved in community control, that system which has been under the greatest pressure for community control will be analyzed—namely the police. To appreciate the complexities of the various issues involved, it will be necessary to present a fundamental background of policy-community relations indicating the degree to which police-citizen interactions can either yield a demand for community control or leave the community relatively satisfied. In any event, should there be considered any necessity to effect greater community control over the police by segments of the community, it is almost certain that this necessity will also be extrapolated to the entire Administration of Justice System as well, since activities of our police organizations are considered representative of the entire Administration of Justice System.

Police and Citizen Encounters

If our task is, indeed, redesigning our police system to more clearly meet the social needs and public service needs, perhaps we can begin by creating a bridge between inner city communities and police departments. Lisa Liebert [1] identified the areas for which this bridge can be made as delinquency, bad housing, unemployment, family disorder, and direct criminal inclination. Because police work is intimately connected to and affected by these areas, what the police require is an area of action which will facilitate their being identified in a helpful role rather than a punitive role. In short, the punitive role the police are seen in, the nature of their organizational structure, and the vast number of adversary contacts they experience with the public almost neutralize any aspirations of a police-community relations program.

In analyzing police-citizen interaction, these interactions generally occur in times of stress for either one or both parties. Therefore, the ensuing role enactment of the officer will

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be appreciably affected, more so than other routine public employee-citizen encounters. Furthermore, police encounters with citizens from minority groups are filled with an extreme amount of uncertainty, for the police officer has learned from experience that he must be alert for violence and resentment [2].

Another source of uncertainty in police interactions with citizens is simply that police lack the training and knowledge of appropriate interpersonal skills that can be used by police officers in encounters with citizens [3].

Assuming that policemen, like most other actors, prefer ordered and routine social encounters to disorganized and unpredictable encounters, then one level or sanction that is available to citizens in encounters with the police is their capacity to disrupt it, particularly to "make trouble" by denying the legitimacy of police authority [4].

A significant contribution by the University of Michigan Report, was its discovery of the reciprocal expectations of police and citizens. This paradox finds its genesis in the "business like," routinized, or "impersonal" bureaucratic treatment citizens received from police, or as Reiss and Black state [4]:

The citizen who treats the officer with civility may regard civility in the officer as a sign of disrespect. And, the officer who meets civility in the citizen may perceive it as a sign of disrespect. The paradox arises because of their reciprocal expectations. The citizen wants the officer to behave with more than civility; he wants to be treated as a "person" or with what has come to be termed a "human relations" perspective. The officer wants the citizen to behave with more than civility, to show deference to his authority.

The dilemma this presents to the policeman is how to become more "involved" with his clients on a "personal" level and yet retain the impartiality that the police organization demands of him as a professional officer. Police resistance to involvement with their clients cannot simply be addressed by "human relations" seminars because the resistance is imbedded in the organizational structure of our police system more than it is in the personality structure of those working within the system, although this too is a factor.

So as organizations experience difficulty with both role articulation and the encounters of its members and the public, the public will remain apathetic only so long, and then segments of that community will press for greater control over their public organizations. Therefore, a necessary first ingredient is for a situation to exist which causes the community some degree of concern, which policy-community relations most assuredly does.

Secondly, the community involvement in this concern can become pervasive due to the high visibility of our police organizations, and also, because of the adversarial role which has been defined. This means there will occur adversarial interactions not on a selective basis as police would prefer to visualize, but on a collective basis of interacting with the entire spectrum of the public.

Third, because our police organizations have not structured, or organizationally provided for, community participation or means and measures to engage the public to participate with them in those issues which the community has an obvious concern and involvement, it structures, and indeed initiates other responses by the community, namely that of community control.

In essence, if the community is concerned over an issue or practice, and it is involved enough to want to participate in either acquiring further information and knowledge, or in expressing its point of view, or in participating in policy matters and decision making; and if this community finds the public organization resistant to these desires, then desires for participation become translated into demand for greater control.

Therefore, either faulty police-citizen encounters or inadequate organizational mechanisms for engaging community concern, involvement, and participation can create cir-

cumstances in which the community presses for greater control of its police organizations. Frequently, both these conditions mutually coexist and quite properly should cause the community sufficient misgivings. Unless these conditions are ameliorated by the police organization, the public would indeed be remiss not to demand greater control over its organization.

Historical Emergence of Community Participation and Control

The greater involvement, participation, and control of public organizations by the community is not without precedent. In fact there is a very rich historical background which can shed a great deal of light on the problems of alienation that the police and the community are presently experiencing.

With respect to the federal government, the first three decades of the 20th Century witnessed the growth of direct relationships with individuals which were considered to be forms of community participation. These included: the role of tribal organizations in dealing with the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Division of the Public Health Service; the responsibilities of citizen members of Selective Service Boards; the relationships between the Department of Agriculture and farmer committees; and the activities of tenants' associations in low-rent public housing projects. Although these early federal-private relationships were important insofar as they firmly established the idea that citizens have a legitimate role to play in government policy making, the real beginning of the citizen participation movement, as we know it today, can be traced to the immediate post-World War II period. Starting in the late 1940's and continuing for the next 20 years, the federal government assumed the leadership role in this area [5].

Stenberg observes that between 1949-1963 the prevailing model was one of the non-indigenous citizen as an adviser-persuader. Several federal programs enacted from the end of the 1940's through the beginning of the Johnson Administration had citizen participation components. Three of the most important were Urban Renewal, the Workable Program for Community Development, and the Juvenile Delinquency Demonstration Projects excluding Mobilization for Youth. In general, nonindigenous citizens were involved in these programs in an advisory and persuading capacity. Most of the citizens were white planners, businessmen, civil leaders, and representative of various groups and interests in the community, such as retail and manufacturing, construction, real estate, finance, labor, taxpayers, religion, and education. There were city rather than neighborhood leaders, and their orientation was directed to meeting community wide needs, not neighborhood problems, through the federal program. For the most part, there was little or no direct participation by the residents of affected areas. These nonindigenous, "blue ribbon" citizens participated through belonging to city wide citizen advisory committees (CAC's) for a workable program or Urban Renewal project or through serving on the government board of a delinquency demonstration project. Membership was usually by virtue of the citizens' association with civic, business, educational, and similar groups, as well as with the political elite of the community [5].

The types of participation included studying the nature of the problems of the target area and alternative solutions, usually without staff assistance. Citizen members advised officials of these needs and recommended possible ways to meet them. Their power, however, was limited to persuasion. A major purpose of this kind of citizen involvement, in the view of many federal and local officials, was often to promote community understanding of a controversial project and to build popular support for its implementation. With respect to the impact of citizen participation, residents of target areas were not

generally involved in project planning and development. "Good government" types served as community, rather than neighborhood representatives on CAC's or delinquency demonstration governing boards. Public officials advised, recommended, and persuaded citizens as to the need for and design of a project—rather than vice versa—and this "educating" of citizen members usually resulted in long delays in planning and programming. In the final analysis, citizens had little or no influence on official policy decisions. Their participation fulfilled the social or therapeutic needs in terms of "selling" unpopular programs like Urban Renewal [5].

During the four year period between 1964–1968 a new model for community participation emerged which Stenberg [5] describes as the indigenous citizen as partner-adversary. In Stenberg's view, Model Cities and Community Action programs were departures from the previous model of community participation, in that the type of citizen changed, as well as the goals and strategy of his involvement. "Citizens" were no longer predominantly affluent whites; instead they were mainly poor minority group members. They were generally neighborhood rather than citywide oriented.

In both programs a formal citizen participation structure was established. Citizens were accorded a role in policy making, as well as serving in an advisory capacity. Neighborhood organizations and their representatives were considered to be partners with government agencies in a coalition relationship; and, particularly with respect to CAC's, they often were viewed as the controlling force in deciding programs to be funded in neighborhood areas. Several objectives were reflected in the Community Action and Model Cities citizen participation structures. Both federal officials and citizens sought generally to build black community identification and to develop indigenous leadership that could unite diverse groups of the urban poor and help increase the political efficacy of low-income people. Another goal was to "democratize" the bureaucracy by having formally organized representative neighborhood decision-making bodies serve as spokesmen for the poor and bargain with the power structure in their behalf. While several of the above objectives have been realized, the impact of citizen involvement in Community Action and Model Cities has varied widely. In some cities participation has not amounted to actual shared decision making or resulted in citizens having coequal status with public officials and bureaucrats. Collaboration and placation, rather than control and power, characterized the citizen role here. In other areas, power was shared with citizens, often as a result of their taking it rather than the city giving it to them. Confrontation produced a meaningful citizen role in decision making, but this adversary relationship rather than partnership or coalition relationship also tended to alienate the CAC in particular from other city agencies [5].

Stenberg [5] suggests that the most recent model which emerged in 1969 and is still in vogue today is the regionalism-decentralization model. This model has been characterized by several types of administrative responses which have been made by local jurisdictions to the problems of citizen alienation and remote government decision makers. "Meet your mayor" or "town hall" meetings and regular legislative body sessions have been held in neighborhood areas. A special telephone number has been designated for citizens to use in registering complaints, or an office has been established to act on or relay grievances to appropriate departments. Community wide resident committees composed of citizen representatives have been created to advise public officials in such functional areas as police, schools, housing, recreation, and health and hospitals. Neighborhood councils representing residents have been formed. Community service officers, neighborsmen, or ombudsmen have been appointed to answer inquires and investigate complaints concerning deficiencies in public services and to perform liaison functions between city hall and neighborhoods. Little city halls and multi-service centers have been set up in neighbor-

hoods to bring government closer to the people, and resident boards occasionally have been selected to advise the heads of these agencies.

These experiments were premised on the belief that improved communications, coupled with decentralized delivery of services, would overcome "politic sclerosis" or hardening of the arteries of political communication and improve the delivery of services on the neighborhood level, thereby dissipating political alienation [6].

To fully comprehend the dynamics and complexities of citizen participation and advisory groups, Professor James Riedel [7] presents a very informative and provocative classification, which underscores the realities of the situation. The categories obviously reflect political functions or the implicit motives of the appointing agency. Therefore, it might be more accurate to put them in categories called: (a) advisory, (b) supportive, (c) put-off, and (d) put-on committees.

In essence, when a public agency calls into being a "committee" of persons not a part of the bureaucratic hierarchy, it is an indication of some kind of uncertainty that includes the willingness, capacity, appropriateness, or whatever, of the appointing agency to make the required decisions alone. This is citizen participation in which the appointing agency maintains some control over the group's output, and which reveals something about the relationship between the government and the governed from the perspective of the governors [7].

Perhaps a useful model to compare the concerns for greater citizen involvement, participation, and control that are beginning to emerge in the criminal justice system would be an analysis of the public school system. Many of the issues surrounding centralization and decentralization have been articulated by various groups and governmental agencies within our public educational field as discussed in the following excerpt [6]:

In 1967 the New York State Legislature responded to Mayor John V. Lindsay's request for additional school aid by passing a law—chapter 484—requiring the mayor to submit a school decentralization plan to the 1968 Legislature as a condition for the receipt of additional state aid. The mayor appointed an Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools and selected McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, to head the panel. In November 1967 the panel added impetus to the movement for community control of schools by recommending that the Legislature establish 30 to 60 community school districts, each to be governed by an 11-member board. Community control would be assured by having parents elect six members; the mayor would appoint the other five in order to achieve balanced representation of all groups in each district. Each board would be authorized to determine the curriculum and use of buildings, select classroom materials, hire and fire teachers, and grant tenure.

The Bundy Plan for greater public participation in the school system was attacked strongly by the Council of Supervisory Associations and the 55,000 member United Federation of Teachers (UFT) a union favoring administrative decentralization. Fears were expressed that professionalism would be undermined, racial segregation would be promoted, and black teachers would espouse anti-white sentiments in classrooms.

Following extended debate and political maneuvering, the Legislature in 1969 enacted a law—chapter 330—decentralizing New York City's school system by establishing a federated system with limited community control effective July 1, 1970. Representing a compromise between the existing system and independent community school districts, the law has been criticized for giving too much and too little power to local communities.

A district is governed by a community school board composed of nine unsalaried members elected at-large for a two-year term by proportional representation (PR). The community school boards have jurisdiction over public schools from the pre-kindergarten level through junior high school. Each board may hire and establish the salary of a district superintendent of schools, contract for repairs and maintenance up to \$250,000 annually, determine the

curriculum in conformance with city and state standards, recommend school sites, submit an annual budget to the chancellor, select textbooks from lists prepared by the chancellor, operate social centers and recreational programs, and appoint teacher aides.

The city wide Board of Education remains in charge of high schools and special schools not under the jurisdiction of community boards, and is authorized to suspend, remove, or supersede a community school board or remove any of its members. In addition, the Board of Education retains extensive financial and personnel powers, including the preparation of the capital budget, and the disciplining and licensing of teachers.

In discussing public education, or for that matter any other governmental service, Zimmerman [6] offers a very enlightening observation: "Professionalism and the tenets of the municipal reform are under attack in large American cities by populists who contend that institutional arrangements have maximized the wrong values by placing too much emphasis upon centralization of power in city hall, professionalism, economy, and efficiency, and paying too little attention to responsiveness as a criterion of democratic government."

Community Control of Professionalism

Having established sufficient background material surrounding the complex issue of community involvement, participation, and control, we shall proceed to directly address the concept of community control of police organizations.

Ostrom and Whitaker [8] observe that "there are two types of remedies most frequently recommended for reducing the overt antagonism, mistrust, and hatred of the police by many black citizens. One remedy involves increasing the "professionalization" of the police. Professional departments are said to have attributes which include the following:

1. Recruitment on the basis of achievement.
2. Treatment of equals in an equal fashion.
3. Negative attitudes toward graft both within the force and in the community.
4. Commitment to training of generally applicable standards.
5. Bureaucratic distribution of authority.

In communities served by "professionalized" departments, law enforcement may be stricter, but it is thought to be more equally applied to all groups in the community than in non-professional departments.

An alternative proposal to alleviate the growing tension between black citizens and the police is community control of the police [8]. Proponents argue that reducing the size of local police jurisdictions and bringing the jurisdiction under the control of the citizens living in the community served will increase the capacity of local police to provide services needed by community residents. This may be expected to increase citizens' satisfaction with their police.

After analyzing some of the arguments surrounding the issue of community control of the police, Ostrom and Whitaker [8] derived nine propositions to elucidate the theoretical issues involved in this problem. The propositions are enumerated as follows:

1. Police officers and police administrators working in small sized police agencies will have better information about the area they serve and conditions in the field than their counterparts in larger agencies.
2. Citizens living in community-controlled jurisdictions will have more capability to articulate demands for service, will have better knowledge about the police and will provide more support for the police than citizens living in city-wide controlled jurisdictions.

3. An increase in the capacity of citizens to articulate demands for service more effectively and an increase in their knowledge about the police will be associated with an increase in the knowledge that police officers and police administrators have of citizen preferences.

4. An increase in the citizens' knowledge about police will be associated with an increase in their support of police.

5. An increase in citizens' support of police will be associated with an increase in the levels of police output.

6. An increase in the knowledge of police officers about the area they are serving and about citizen preferences will be associated with an increase in the levels of police output.

7. An increase in the knowledge of police administrators of field conditions in their area will be associated with an increase in their effective control over actions of their department.

8. An increase in the effective control of police administrators over actions of their department will be associated with an increase in the levels of police output.

9. An increase in the levels of police output will be associated with an increase in citizen support for the police.

To fully appreciate the above nine propositions, while at the same time sensitizing oneself to the parameters of the issues in the concept of community control of the police, the following section will specifically focus on arguments put forth that would either support or not support the general issue of community control.

Pros and Cons of Community Control

Ostrom and Whitaker [8] enumerate the arguments against community control as follows: The first argument is that community control supports separatism. The second argument is that community control creates balkanization of public services and is more costly and less efficient. The third argument against community control is that local decision-making within small communities may be more "undemocratic" than within larger units. The fourth argument is that small, community controlled police departments will be less professional. It is assumed that a relatively large department is needed to be able to afford adequate salaries and good training facilities and that small departments just cannot attract the caliber of employees equivalent to that of large departments. Finally, it is argued that community control may be a futile strategy if significant reallocation of resources were not also accomplished at the same time.

The response of proponents have been articulated as follows [8]: First, proponents of community control have counter arguments for each of the attacks against community control. As to separatism, they argue that segregation is a fact imposed on inner city minorities by the unwillingness of white citizens to allow integration in any meaningful form. Community control would not appreciably increase the amount of segregation and racism currently in existence—it would give to those who had been denied open access to housing a greater opportunity to control what happens in their own neighborhood. Second, as to the charge that community control would create more small districts, proponents would argue that community control would enable blacks in the center city to have the personalized, small-scale service provided today to whites in the suburbs. Third, as to the level of democratic government possible in small units, proponents of community control argue that once minority citizens had genuine control concerning local affairs, participation levels would increase. Fourth, concerning professionalization, proponents of community control argue that many of the consequences of "professionalization" have been to keep citizens from obtaining jobs due to false education requirements

or middle class biased examinations. The establishment of less bureaucratized forces with police living in the community they serve and sympathetic to the life style of the residents is seen as a benefit rather than a cost. Finally, many of the needs of poor areas are not solved by the mere infusion of more economic resources. Frequently, the need is to fit public services to the particular needs of a community.

Zimmerman elucidates the pro and con approach to community control by offering the thought that we must seek more empirical research if we are to meaningfully understand the pro and con positions of community control issues.

Advocates of community control maintain that a system of neighborhood government will prove beneficial in ghetto neighborhoods by restoring a sense of community. Unfortunately, this conclusion has little empirical support. The highly mobile population and relatively large size of proposed neighborhood governments—a population as great as 250,000—would make impossible the development of a deep-felt sense of community. On the contrary, many ghetto residents have developed a sense of rootlessness. The theory of neighborhood government is based upon the assumption that there is a coalescence of common interests within a definable geographic territory. It is apparent, however, that conflict may be more prevalent in many neighborhoods than a commonality of interests. In New York City, for example, we find blacks and Puerto Ricans fighting for control of neighborhood corporations and Model Cities citizen committees [6].

One would be on tenuous ground if he concluded that neighborhood governments will revitalize democracy on the local level by dramatically increasing citizen participation. Such a conclusion is wishful thinking, as low citizen participation is a fact of political life in a day and age when there are many diversions, including television. As the locus of authority in the city becomes loci with the devolution of political power, citizens hopefully will be able to identify more readily with neighborhood governments because of their smaller scale and this identification may take the form of greater citizen participation. We would be deceiving ourselves, however, if we concluded that idealized town meeting democracy could be replicated on the neighborhood level in large cities, as we know that disadvantaged citizens are relatively apathetic. There is little evidence to suggest that neighborhood governments would be more innovative or able to provide services more economically than the existing municipal governments; the latter is more likely to benefit from economics of scale. Although ghetto residents may be quite willing to try innovations, it is unlikely that they will be able, on the basis of their limited education and experience, to develop innovations that will be more beneficial than innovations developed by professionals [6].

Professor Riedel views the issue of community control, not simply as a mechanical problem but as an intense political problem. In his view changing the forms of representation, or protecting the existing ones, are political questions because the outcome may shift control over enforced values and the distribution of scarce resources from one aggregation of groups to another. Without any intent to discourage anyone from any effort to advance his worthy goals, even through gimmicks and euphemisms, it may still be useful to review some of the harsh political realities about citizen participation [7].

1. Even under the best of conditions, most people tend to avoid participation and involvement.
2. Our political system favors group over individual action, coalitions of groups (parties) even more so, but most individuals are activated only by single issues and are turned off by coalitions.
3. Localizing control does not necessarily increase participation.

4. Resistance to action tends to increase with the seriousness of the problem.
5. Citizen groups working outside the "system" tend to handicap themselves.
6. Official and citizen views of participation tend to be inherently contradictory.
7. Officially sponsored citizen participation tends to be co-optation rather than representation.
8. Direct citizen action, forcing governmental response; though seemingly hostile to the system, has strong historic support.
9. In this pragmatic society, the appropriate form of citizen participation is the one that works.

In essence, Riedel's understanding of the current upsurge of interest in participation is that many are not talking about representative participation at all. They are asking for a direct transfer or reallocation of political (governmental) power, and without having to achieve it through the tedious requirements of the existing political system. This is the pursuit of a phantom. Insofar as any redistribution of power is likely to occur, and it will, it will be because such individuals and groups who succeed will have, whether wittingly or unwittingly, played the age-old political game and won [7].

Challenge to Police and Public Administration Theory

In light of the changes which have occurred since 1949—from nonindigenous to indigenous citizen representation and from adviser-persuader to coalition-adversary decision maker—what types of citizen participation will emerge in the years ahead? What roles and responsibilities will the various levels of government assume? What problems will have to be surmounted in order to reach alienated citizens, reform unresponsive bureaucracies, and eliminate ineffective services? And what are the implications of the likely style of citizen participation in the 1970's for the teaching and practice of public administration? The citizen participation movement in the 1970's will be accompanied by demands for major changes in the values, training, and rewarding of public administrators. Increased pressure will be placed on bureaucracies and on schools of public administration to make their efforts relevant to the times. Less attention will be given to the conflict between citizen involvement and traditional public administration, and more concern will be directed to the ways in which their common purpose, the effective delivery of services, can be achieved through cooperative action. Many public administrators will need to undergo certain attitudinal modifications, such as being more inclined to take to the streets to find out first-hand if public services are adequate for resident needs, and be more willing to tolerate delays, inefficiencies, and disruptions in planning and programming stemming from citizen participation. Rapport with clients is a critical, and too often neglected, criterion that will need to be given a more important place in the administrative reward systems [5].

These types of citizen involvement are commonly thought to be antithetical to much of public administration theory and practice. The idea of "clients" having a voice in the determination of such policies as service levels, staffing patterns, and budgetary priorities is often considered to be unacceptable to administrators. This is particularly the case if the clients happen to be low-income, minority, or uneducated, and if they desire to do more than merely offer advice or be informed of decisions. In this sense, there is built-in conflict between citizen participation and the middle class values of bureaucrats, the objectives of the merit system, and the traditional principles of hierarchy and professionalism found in American administrative thought [5].

Not only will public administrators have to increase their face-to-face contacts with the community and to share their authority with citizen representatives, but they might also have to recognize the relevance of the concept of advocacy that has been receiving more and more attention in the planning profession. "Advocate bureaucrats" working for community groups would, among other functions, serve as grantsmen in identifying sources of funds and preparing the necessary applications, help residents gain access to key decision makers, cut red tape, and supervise the operation of neighborhood-controlled programs. More importantly, they would work within the bureaucracy as proponents of their client's views regarding community needs and the best ways to meet them [5].

To sum up, citizens in large cities generally are interested only in the delivery of quality services. So long as quality services in adequate amounts are delivered on the neighborhood level, the average citizen will be little interested in community control of governmental institutions and functions [6].

Challenge to Develop Empirical Analysis of the Community Control Concept

It would appear as though there are at least four very critical issues which must be addressed in this concept of community control of police organizations. Moreover, before one could make an informed judgment on this question, these critical issues should be addressed by empirical field research.

First, the issue of how one insures or restores meaningful democratic civilian control over police organizations. Second, how to realistically engage citizen involvement and participation to reduce police-community alienation, without unilaterally making decisions as to community control that might tend to exacerbate the polarization that presently exists. Third, how might we propose to address the issue of representation which extends beyond our police organization and into the very fabric of our governmental structure. Finally, as David Riley [9] has observed, the issue concerning political control of our police organizations must be addressed, not in terms of whether it exists or does not exist, but in the more realistic terms of who exercises the political control.

In essence, the arguments for and against community control of police organizations will remain at a theoretical level until empirical research which addresses these critical issues has been tested. Moreover, we must also be aware of the vagueness and ambiguity that surrounds the concept of community control. As presently articulated by many spokesmen, little is offered by way of definition to constitute a meaningful guide to the host of public policy considerations that must be made.

Conclusion

Finally we must be sensitive to the following: Demands for greater community control indicate a strong vitality and interest in our police organizations, and this should not necessarily be written off negatively, as it does replace the previous public apathy that confounded police administrators. Moreover, there are numerous situations both with police organizations and other components of our Administration of Justice System that could benefit from this greater public awareness and interest. For example, one of the frustrating paradoxes, has been efforts by correctional administrators to gain greater community acceptance to the concept of community based correctional centers. If criminal justice officials could channel some of the community's demand for control of police organizations to also include that of correctional facilities, perhaps the public's resistance to residential treatment centers would diminish; and, at the same time this might stimulate the community's interest and involvement in additional components of our criminal

justice system. The impact of this would be not to ascribe to a few the total responsibility for criminality and its control, but to now embark on a much more realistic endeavor of mutual involvement, concern, and participation, in matters that affect the entire community, and should therefore quite properly engage the entire community.

Furthermore, demands for greater community control of our Administration of Justice System, in general, and police organizations, in particular, reflect a continuing awareness and interest in the situations that confront our criminal justice agencies. We would be well advised, to cultivate this community interest, instead of resisting it. At the same time, those of us in the criminal justice field should own up to our own responsibilities, for example, we have designed and organized criminal justice agencies that have organizationally emasculated the citizen's interest and participation. How many police, court, and correctional administrators can state that their departments have structured and organizationally provided for definitive pathways and means in which it is possible to engage their citizen's or community's **concern, involvement, support, and participation**. In my view, it is the absence of these structured pathways or channels, which plays a formidable role in the isolationism of our criminal justice agencies, the very issue community control is all about.

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